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Editorial: Information Security 
Claire Laybats & Luke Tredinnick 
This issue of Business Information Review takes a focused look at Information 
Security, and the role of information professionals in securing information systems 
and processes. Information security is not simply a matter of IT security; it also 
encompasses legal compliance, governance, and workflow issues. Nevertheless a 
series of high profile cyber-attacks in recent years have bought the question of 
information security to greater public attention, and thrown light on our growing 
dependency on digital technologies. Privacy, data protection, and the misuse of data 
are now driving the political agenda around information security in some sectors. 
How did this come to be and why has information security risen up the political and 
commercial agenda? 
 
The rise of information security 
For many, 2015 was the year that information security became global news, with a 
string of news stories concerning major hacking or data breaches. Yet the current 
focus on information security issues really begins a little earlier, with the 
politicization of cyber activism, and it’s attention to questions of privacy and civil 
liberties.  
In 2010 the international non-profit journalistic website Wikileaks began publishing a 
batch of leaked US diplomatic cables. Although Wikileaks had been around for a 
number of years as a place where whistleblowers could anonymously leak sensitive 
or classified documents, the publishing of the diplomatic cables marked a significant 
change in the international profile of the organization. It also marked a change in 
tactics: Wikileaks working in collaboration with a number of traditional newspapers 
across the US and Europe to manage the disclosure. Old media and new media were 
coming together. The scale of the leak was unprecedented; over two hundred and 
sixty million words of data was involved, and the publication created headlines 
across the world over successive weeks. This was the largest disclosure of classified 
government information in history. And it was just the beginning of a new form of 
political activism relient on our growing dependency on information technology and 
on the architecture and infrastructure of the information age.  
The cablegate affair mirrored a fundamental change in the function, role and scale of 
information in political and commercial organizations. On the one hand we now 
gather and maintain vast collections of information like never before across 
government and business. In the age of big data all information has value. On the 
other hand these vast swathes of data are subject to rapid and easy manipulation, 
and sometimes lax oversight.  The nature of the digital infrastructure underpinning 
contemporary society makes it easier to manipulate information at volume. The fact 
that millions of documents can be carried on a tiny storage device and transmitted 
globally across high speed data networks makes leaks of the scale of cablegate 
almost inevitable. Information wants to be free. And that means that political 
motivated data leaks now come in gigabytes, rather than pages. There is even a new 
profession that trades in transforming vast data sets into publically comprehensible 
stories: data journalism. 
The cablegate affair established a pattern that was set to continue. In 2013 the 
computer professional Edward Snowdan leaked about 9000 documents originating 
from the US National Security Agency (NSA). The documents not only in themselves 
highlighted the vulnerability of digital information to disclosure, but also detailed the 
degree to which security agencies were engaged in systematic surveillance of digital 
communications globally.  This year the disclosure of 11.5 million documents from 
the Panama based corporate services provider Mossack Fonseca has exposed the 
details of global finance and led to the resignation of the Icelandic prime minister. In 
between dozens of smaller political leaks have maintained a constant stream of 
information emerging from cyber activism.  
The high profile cases related above reflect the rise of hacktivism – political activism 
that comes in the form of hacking and exploiting information systems and 
communications networks, with a focus on issues around civil liberties, privacy and 
freedom of speech. Hacktivism is not just a concern for governments, increasingly it 
is emerging as a tool to attack commercial enterprises. After the cablegate leaks the 
Anyonymous collective attacked companies who had withdrawn services from the 
Wikileaks foundation, including Amazon. In July 2015 a politically motivated group 
compromised and leaked customer account information for Ashley Madison, a 
website that traded in facilitating extra-marital affairs.  The account details 
subsequently appeared online. The disintermediating effects of the global 
information network enables this kinds of direct action.  
A few months after the Ashley Madison hack, the British telecommunications 
services provider Talk Talk sustained what it described as “a significant and sustained 
cyber attack” (BBC, 2015). Customer account details including payment details were 
compromised in what appeared to be a corporate extortion attack. It later transpired 
that the account details were not encrypted. This was not hactivism, but another 
side effect of a global digital economy: cybercrime. In November 2015 ten million 
account profiles for the VTech educational software company were compromised.  
The same month, the credit referencing agency Experien was hacked with customer 
information of up to 15 million customers compromised. Each year there are 
countless cases of extortion and blackmail based on data breaches, many of which 
go unreported. Each case creates untold anxiety amongst the organizations’ 
customer bases and did untold damage to the reputations of the organizations 
involved.   
If the kinds of incidents described above seem to be becoming more and more 
common in the twenty-first century, that is because they are. They testify to a 
fundamental change in the global information and communications infrastructure. 
Information itself has become more integral to every part of our lives. Individuals, 
business and governments now generate vastly more information each day than 
even in the relatively recent past. All commercial operations are now to some degree 
in the business of managing, manipulating and selling information in one form or 
another. In a very real sense information is value in the digital economy. But 
information has also become a kind of currency; we exchange information about our 
interests and identity in order to access services online.  If information has greater 
value, then it becomes more susceptible to criminal or political intervention.  
But despite appearances, there has not been a sudden explosion in the volume of 
cybercrime and cyber activism, or indeed a sudden rise in the importance of 
information security. While it has become over recent years matter of widespread 
public concern and media interest, the problem of information security has been 
with us for over thirty years, and growing steadily throughout that time. Indeed, the 
origins of hacking, cyber activism and cybercrime in the hobbyist computing 
subculture the 1970s still has a significant bearing on how the issue is framed in 
contemporary culture, and out responses to it. Therefore it is worth briefly exploring 
what this relationship is.  
 
The beginnings of cybercrime 
Cybercrime in Britain has a definitive beginning. In 1984 a young computer hacker 
who went by the pseudonym of Triludan the Warrior was messing around with a 
modem and home computer. He already had a Prestel account of his own, but that 
didn’t stop him typing a string of 2s at the log-in prompt of the system. To his 
surprise, the username was accepted. Triludan sat back from the keyboard. If 
someone had chosen such a basic string of characters for a username, he thought, 
perhaps they had applied the same approach to the password. After a few attempts 
he was in with 1234. Without really trying he had gained full access to a test account 
owned by a British Telecom employee. It was almost as if British Telecom wasn’t 
taking security seriously at all. He later recalled: "I came across a Prestel test ID by 
accident – I was testing a modem and just typed random numbers, basically” (Cited by 
Leyden, 2015). That accident was the beginning of what became one of the most 
important hacking cases in British legal history. 
Prestel was then still a relatively new videotex system; it had been developed by 
British Telecom in the late 1970s and by the mid nineteen eighties had almost one 
hundred thousand subscribers. Most users accessed Prestel via a dumb terminal 
connected to a television set, but it could also be accessed via computer and modem. 
This was the dawn of consumer online systems, and the very latest addition to 
Prestel was Mailbox, a service that allowed subscribers to send electronic messages 
to one another.  
Triludan’s test account gave access to information on Prestel that ordinary users 
could not see – information about the organization of the Prestel system, and also a 
list of telephone numbers for development computers. He shared this with friend 
and journalist, Stephen Gold, and together the two hackers found a way to gain root 
access to the main Prestel service. They could now change, delete, or read any of the 
pages on Prestel. They could access and send messages from every user mailbox. To 
prove what they had done, they left a message on the Duke of Edinburgh’s Mailbox, 
and after trying to warn British Telecom directly, they contacted the press. Stephen 
Gold and a now unmasked Robert Schifreen were arrested shortly after.  
By the early 1980s hacking was beginning to garner increasing public awareness. Just 
a year before the Prestel Hack, the film WarGames (1983) had highlighted the 
potential dangers of hacking with typical Hollywood overstatement, as a youthful 
Matthew Broderick graduated from altering high school grades to bringing the world 
to the brink of nuclear war. The same year, the 414s, a group of teenage hackers in 
Wisconsin, were identified after having accessed government computers and banks. 
In Europe, the recently formed Chaos Computer Club was already beginning to 
attract mainstream attention, and by 1985 would become known around the world 
for transferring 134,000 DMs in a hack of a precursor to online baking systems.  
Public attitudes towards cybercrime had been primed by this kind of coverage, and 
by the strange, unfathomable nature of the emerging online world. Cyberspace – 
coined by William Gibson the same year as the Prestel hack – was an alluring but 
unfamiliar place for most. Many of the stereotypes we still associate with hacking 
and cybercrime – the brilliant but socially awkward and isolated teenager working 
from their bedroom in the middle of the night- were forged during this period. 
British public opinion was primed for a major information security scandal, and the 
Prestel hack came at precisely the right time. 
However it was not immediately clear what offence Schiffreen and Gold had 
committed. The UK did not have dedicated laws against cybercrime at this time, and 
while successful prosecutions had been bought in the United States by charging 
hackers with theft of minute quantities of electricity from the systems they 
penetrated, it was thought that a counterfeiting charge might be more successful. 
The case hinged on whether the username and password used by Schrifreen and 
Gold constituted a counterfeited instrument. While they were initially found guilty, 
eventually on appeal they were acquitted with the law lords criticizing the 
“procrustean” attempts to bring the forgery act to bear on a computer crime.   
What followed in the wake of R v. Schifreen & Gold (1988) was a scramble to 
introduce legislation to protect against the emerging threats of hacking and 
computer crime. Largely influenced by popular stereotypes and public 
misconceptions rather than real threats, the first Computer Misuse Act (1990) cast 
its net fairly wide with vague and ambiguous wording throughout. It did not, for 
example, define computer. It did not define a computer program. It did not define 
data.  Despite this potentially wide reach only a handful of successful prosecutions 
have been bought. As a recent ONS discussion paper (2014) reveals, there is a 
massive discrepancy between the perception of risk, and the number of offences 
that have been committed.   
Thirty years later, the R. V Gold & Schifreen seems rather quaint. Hacking, 
information security, and cybercrime are no longer the preserve of lone hackers 
working from their bedrooms. Not only Prestel, but the whole culture of online 
bulletin board systems accessed via direct dial-up connections has gone by the 
wayside. Yet the issue of cybercrime and information security has not gone away. 
Indeed, over the last few years it has come to haunt the tech industry. And the way 
in which we think about cybercrime and information security is still influenced by 
idea of the brilliant hacker working in isolation to penetrate distant and arcane 
information systems.  
The legacy of the Prestel hack endures in our attitudes towards information security, 
cybercrime, and risk, and endures in the computing misuse legislation in force in the 
UK. In some sense information security is still most commonly framed as an external 
threat emanating from some nefarious source, rather than as a matter of internal 
risk management. The coverage of more recent high profile hacking cases and 
information security breaches re-enforces this idea of an external threat. But in 
many ways, the major problems that are created by out increased dependency on 
information are not the external threats to which it is subjected, but the internal 
processes by which it is managed.  
 
What is Information Security? 
At first glance, information security seems like a fairly straightforward and 
uncomplicated concept – a matter of technically securing information systems and 
data against unwanted intruders, malicious software, and unwanted use, and 
maintaining the fitness for purpose of information in order to minimize institutional 
risk. However, information security is more than just a matter of IT security. It is 
more than simply maintaining firewalls, anti-malware software, and secure 
passwords. The security of information poses innumerable risks for businesses in the 
contemporary world: the risk of falling foul of the information law; the risk of 
significant reputation damage through data breaches and leaks; the risk of not being 
able to conduct business owing to catastrophic failure of information systems, and 
the risk of becoming subject to sustained political action aimed at disrupting 
commercial operations. 
Most definitions of information security encompass a number of different issues in 
relation to information and data management: confidentiality; integrity and 
availability. Confidentiality relates to limiting the availability of information to 
unauthorized individuals or entities – essentially preventing information falling into 
the hands of those  we would like to prevent accessing it. Integrity on the other hand 
relates to maintaining the accuracy and completeness of the information collection 
over its life cycle including managing and auditing modifications to the data or data 
collection. Availability is a matter of insuring the information is available to the 
processes in which it is required, and that the security controls and processes are fit 
for purpose.   
We of course inevitably associate information security with digital information 
because so much of the information on which contemporary commercial practice 
currently depends is digital in nature. However, unlike IT security, information 
security does not necessarily or exclusively relate to digital information.  
The technological components of information security are relatively well understood. 
Firewalls monitor, block and filter traffic on networks. Anti virus, anti spyware, and 
anti malware software scans programmes and data for malicious content. Strong 
encryption secures data, data transfer and communications against eavesdropping 
and accidental leaks.  Access management, version management, and audit logs help 
maintain the integrity of information systems. These components are the high walls, 
locks, security gates, and the barred windows of information security, interrupting 
the free flow of information in order to ensure its control.  But it is a mistake to think 
of information security as a matter or erecting fences, barricading entrances, and 
choosing the most secure locks. Security is not something that is applied to 
information systems and processes after the fact, it is something that must be built 
in from the beginning. 
Building information security into information management processes is a matter of 
understanding the nature of the threats involved. There is a tendency to exaggerate 
the external threats to information and data – the danger of hackers, political 
hacktivists, and various forms of malware - and to underestimate the internal threats 
– the disgruntled or careless employee. Information security threats can be broken 
down into a number of different kinds: 
 The intentional consequences of intentional actions, e.g. hacking, denial of 
service (DoS) attacks, malicious software, spyware, industrial espionage, and 
deliberate data theft, leaks or breaches.  
 
 The unintentional consequences of intentional actions, e.g. accidentally or 
carelessly deleted information, accidentally or carelessly disclosed 
information, unintentional breeches of confidentiality, unintentional data 
leaks.  
 
 The unintentional consequences of unintentional actions, e.g. accidental loss 
of data, accidental destruction of data.  
In many ways the first of these are easiest to predict, and easiest to protect against. 
The intentional consequences of intentional actions describes the kinds of malicious 
actions and software that draw most coverage: hacking; malware and data theft. 
These risks are relatively easy to articulate: the known unknowns of the information 
security world, the events we can anticipate and prepare for. Far harder to predict 
are the unintentional consequences of intended or unintended actions: the critical 
emails that are deleted rather than archived; the information shared with a mailing 
list rather than an individual; the briefcase accidentally left on the train containing a 
batch of client files. We can write policy to prevent employees installing their own 
software and hold them accountable if they do; we can train them to understand the 
risks from malware and spyware involved in this. There is no policy than can prevent 
someone from losing a USB storage device or pressing reply-all on a group email – 
the policy and training implications of these unintentional and unpredictable events 
need to focus on minimizing the potential impact of these risks.  
Information security is a matter of understanding and managing risk, and not 
eliminating threats. When every functional computing device is also a networked 
computing device, there is no such thing as an absolutely secure information system. 
Just as important as maintaining the confidentiality of information is maintaining the 
fitness for purpose of both information and the processes into which it is slotted, 
and this inevitable involves risk. More secure systems bring about their own kinds of 
risks for organizations, the very real trade of between security and the free flow of 
information need to be weighed every day.  
Almost without exception the real information security weak-spots in any system or 
process are not technological vulnerabilities but human operators. Humans have a 
habit of behaving in unpredictable and sometimes inexplicable ways. Hackers have a 
name for exploiting the human problem in information security. It is called social 
engineering.  Social engineering is the process of tricking someone into disclosing 
passwords, access details, or confidential information often by masquerading as 
someone who is or should be entitled to access.  As the infamous hacker and 
subsequently cyber security specialist Kevin Mitnik observes, it is often easier to trick 
someone into allowing you access to a system, than to bother hacking it: 
“For the social engineer, it is the easiest way to reach his goal. Why should an 
attacker spend hours trying to break in when he can do it instead with a 
simple phone call?” (Simon & Mitnick , 2003).    
People behave in ways that they shouldn’t and that they know they shouldn’t 
because often it is more convenient, more polite, or just normal practice. They use 
simple or predictable passwords; the use the same passwords on multiple systems; 
they write down their passwords; they share their log in details with colleagues; they 
respond helpfully to inquiries; they leave systems logged-in;  they take home files on 
memory sticks; they use the same email for personal and professional purposes. We 
all know these things are a problem. And yet we all almost certainly indulge in some 
of these bad information security habits at some point. So ubiquitous are they that it 
becomes almost irresponsible to ignore them. 
The fact that humans are the real weak spot in many information security processes 
highlight that information security should not be considered primarily as a 
technological issue. The technology has altered the scale and intensity of 
communication and information practices, but the underlying  principles of human 
socialization remain the same. Information security is at its heart a problem with 
people, and their messy, unpredictable, organic nature. The way to address 
information security is to understand how information slots into the work processes 
within an organization, and where the vulnerabilities lie.  
 
Information Security and Business Information Review – July 2016 
In 1984 while Robert Schrifreen was idly experimenting with the Prestel log in page, 
Business Information Review had just published its first issue. That issue included 
coverage of the Prestel service and later the journal covered the ensuing court case 
(Tagg, 1986). From its birth through its infancy to today, this journal has precisely 
mirrored the age of information crime and information security in the UK. It is 
perhaps appropriate then that this issue of the journal is focused in particular on 
issues related to information security and governance. By focusing on information 
security and information governance we hope to highlight not only the importance 
of the issue in contemporary business and commerce, but also the contribution of 
the information profession to managing security and risk.  
The articles published in this issue of Business Information Review all address 
questions of information security in one form or another.  First is Ralph O’Brien’s 
paper Privacy and Security: the New European Data Protection Regulation and what 
it means for data breaches. Ralph is Principle Consultant EU for5 TRUSTe, TRUSTe a 
leading global Data Privacy Management company. His paper explores the changing 
regulation around data protection emerging out of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and in particular its impact on the management of 
data breaches.  
The GDPR is also discussed in David Haynes’ paper, Social Media, risk and 
information governance. David is a regular contributor to Business Information 
Review and visiting lecturer at City University London. His paper address what is 
often an overlooked area of information work: social media governance. David’s 
paper develops a risk management model of governance that addresses the threats 
to which social media strategies and outputs give rise. It makes an important case for 
the risks associated with social media and the importance of incorporating them into 
information governance processes.  
A new contributor to the journal, Nick Wilding is Head of Cyber Resilience at AXELOS 
Global Best Practice - a joint venture company set up in 2013 and co-owned by the 
UK Government and Capita plc. Nick is responsible for RESILIA™ Global Best Practice 
- a portfolio of cyber resilience best practice publications, certified training, all staff 
awareness learning and leadership engagement tools designed to put the ‘human 
factor’ at the centre of your cyber resilience strategy. In his paper - Cyber resilience: 
How important is your reputation? How effective are your people – Nick argues for a 
move from thinking about cyber security to thinking about cyber resilience, and 
outlines the guiding principles of cyber awareness learning, training and education.  
Finally, Danny Budzak returns to Business Information Review with a new paper: 
Information Security: the people issue. Danny’s paper examines the information 
security issues raised by the involvement of people with information systems. It first 
sets out the threats to information systems, and the risks associated with 
information systems, before addressing the mitigation of those threats through 
managing roles, responsibilities, relationships and training.  The paper rounds off for 
us an exciting issue, and a new venture into themed content than hopefully we shall 
be developing in the future.  
Initiatives and perspectives 
Regular readers will know that a key part of each issue of Business Information 
Review are the regular Initiatives and Perspectives columns, which both round up 
some of the developments in the business information world. In Perspectives Martin 
White explores recent publications both in the information world and beyond that 
have relevance for professional practice. This issue he draws attention to research 
on data management emerging form the Information School at Sheffield University, 
research into newspaper archiving practice in the United States, and returns to the 
issue of information overload amongst other topics. Once again we are also grateful 
for Alan Fosters continued work in producing Initiatives. This issue Alan addresses a 
range of developments in the areas of digital transformations, data management, 
value and volume of data, higher education and IT, IM and data skills development, 
and open data as well as the latest industry news. As ever it is an incredibly 
comprehensive and useful resource.   
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